I would like to express my sincere gratitude to East China Normal University, the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, and our moderator for giving me the opportunity to participate in the Global South International Communication Forum and to engage in dialogue with all of you.
I work for an academic journal called Wenhua Zongheng (文化纵横), founded in 2008 and now in its 15th year. The print edition has a circulation of approximately 10,000 copies, which is a significant figure for academic journals in China. More notably, we have 3.2 million online readers or "followers," and in 2022 alone, Wenhua Zongheng was read 540 million times. This demonstrates the substantial influence of our journal in the digital sphere.
Today’s discussion focuses on the communication efforts of the Global South. Participants have approached this topic from diverse perspectives—technological, hegemonic, discursive, and localized—exploring how Global South media can build their own influence. My focus, however, is on the relationship between values, ideology, and media, because communication is never truly neutral—it always reflects certain values and is shaped by the political and economic structures behind it. Consider the example of American media, which is largely controlled by capital; there is no media free from underlying political and economic forces.
You, as representatives of the media in the Global South, shoulder the responsibility of advancing the communication cause of the oppressed. During the Cold War, the communication efforts of oppressed peoples drew strength from the Non-Aligned Movement, from the national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and from the support of the socialist bloc. It had a clear banner and ideological foundation. Today, as we seek to advance our own communication endeavors in the Global South, we must ask: What is our foundation? What are our intellectual tools? What is our guiding ideology?
Liberalism may be in decline, yet the set of universal values it promotes remains remarkably resilient and influential. What ideologies and value systems can challenge liberal ideology and support the media efforts of Global South countries? I believe this is a central issue we must confront today. If we fail to clarify this question, we will be unable to clearly articulate the purpose of our communication.
In the past two years, Chinese President Xi Jinping has proposed three major initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. I believe the core of these three initiatives is to realize global justice through global development—that is, the pursuit of development is a pursuit of justice.
Therefore, China should raise the banner of development as its ideological message to the world. For countries of the Global South, development is not only economically significant but also politically vital. To achieve positive development, challenges in areas such as social equality, people's rights, and national sovereignty must be addressed. Without resolving these foundational issues, true development is impossible.
Today, I felt deep sorrow when listening to our friends from Latin America describe the current conditions in their countries. Their social structures are strikingly similar to those of China before 1949, when landlords monopolized land and social resources, while the majority of farmers possessed little of either. Once the process of modernization and industrialization began, landlords came to dominate both industrial investment and the surplus it produced. They also dominated local councils, thereby consolidating both political and economic power. This led to an extremely unequal distribution of wealth resulting from industrialization. Furthermore, the distorted industrialization driven by the landlord class gave rise to a narrow urban middle class. In essence, this middle class was subordinated to capital and became antagonistic to farmers and the vast majority of people at the bottom of society. Such structural contradictions are common across many Third World countries.
Thus, development is, first and foremost, a political issue. If the prerequisites for development—such as equality and environmental improvements—are not met, or if the outcomes of development fail to address political challenges and the systemic issues of global industrialization, then we are heading toward a world with no future. Therefore, in today’s China, development is upheld both as a moral banner and as an ideological one. It is by no means purely economic; it is also inherently political.
The United States has hosted two consecutive “Summits for Democracy,” using democracy as a banner to oppose authoritarianism—this is its form of political correctness. In this context, what banner should the Global South hold high? I believe it should be the banner of development—an assertion of both legitimacy and moral purpose. Compared to the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial slogans of the 1960s, development is a more compelling and unifying call in today’s world. At the same time, the concept of development inherently includes resistance to imperialism and colonialism, as well as the quest for independence and freedom from external control. However, to effectively hold high the banner of development, we must also innovate in our development models and theories.
Overall, international development has seen limited success in the 70 years since the end of World War II. Vijay published an article in Wenhua Zongheng that specifically addresses the issue of development. He divides the post-war development process into three stages, and I will directly reference his views here.
The first stage is characterized by the influence of modernization theory. This paradigm assumed that the present of the West represented the future of developing countries, and that development meant a linear transformation from tradition to modernity. However, this theory overlooked the colonial status of many developing countries and the constraints imposed by the economic and social structures of colonialism. It also ignored the diverse histories, cultures, and national conditions of these countries.
The second stage is marked by the emergence of the New International Economic Order. In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a declaration advocating for such an order, redefining development as the development of people rather than merely things. This stage held great progressive significance for global development. However, when the debt crisis hit many Third World countries, institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed structural adjustment programs. These programs effectively disrupted the momentum of the New International Economic Order.
The third stage is the era of neoliberalism.** Since the 1980s, the prevailing view has been that developing countries should achieve economic growth through full-scale privatization and market liberalization. Politically, they were encouraged to adopt representative democracy, and socially, the theory of civil society was promoted as a pathway to development. However, the neoliberal development model has led to disastrous consequences: the collapse of Sri Lanka, wars in parts of Africa, and persistent development challenges in Latin America—all of which are closely linked to this model.
To date, the development models mentioned above have failed to varying extents. As a result, the world urgently needs new development models and new development theories. What, then, can China’s experience contribute to international development? At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, a new concept was introduced: modernization with Chinese characteristics. What does this concept mean? There are various interpretations, but I would summarize it as having three essential features.
The first characteristic of modernization with Chinese characteristics is that it initiated the early stage of industrialization through revolution. What was the goal of this revolution? Externally, it was to achieve national independence and secure the right to independent and autonomous development. Internally, it aimed to carry out a social revolution and establish a social structure based on equality for all. Overthrowing the unequal social order was a fundamental and necessary condition for modernization with Chinese characteristics. Without revolution, there would be no such path to modernization.
Secondly, China’s early-stage industrial accumulation was carried out through a planned economy and public ownership. This method of accumulation allowed for the rapid concentration of resources and swift development, while ensuring that the gains of development were not monopolized by a privileged few. By 1980, China had established an independent and relatively complete national economic system. Reform and opening-up were implemented on the foundation of this comprehensive industrial base; without it, reform would have lacked the necessary conditions to succeed.
The third characteristic is that, after the initial phase of industrial accumulation was completed, China began to explore the establishment of a socialist market economy, in order to address the inefficiencies of the planned economy and a purely public ownership system. The so-called socialist market economy takes the market as the basic mechanism for resource allocation while fully leveraging the role of government. Its goal is to maintain a dynamic balance between the socialist superstructure and the market-based economic foundation. But who ensures this dynamic balance? Who moderates the relationship between socialism and the market economy? What happens when this balance is disrupted? The answer lies in the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which serves as a powerful force in continuously adjusting this relationship. When market efficiency is too high and inequality becomes excessive, redistribution is emphasized. When society experiences inertia and overall productivity is low, efficiency is prioritized. It is the CPC that continuously recalibrates the relationship between socialism and the market economy. Since the establishment of this system, China had become the world’s second-largest economy by 2012. These are the three characteristics of modernization with Chinese characteristics as I understand them.
These characteristics may offer valuable insights as we reflect on development and international development. Finally, let us return to the broader topic of modernization with Chinese characteristics and the international communication efforts we are undertaking. I believe that this model of modernization is generating strong momentum for global development. The path of modernization with Chinese characteristics is, first and foremost, a political one—not merely an economic one. Without political development, there can be no economic development, nor meaningful social progress. Therefore, modernization with Chinese characteristics should be systematically summarized and elevated to the level of an international development theory with broader global relevance. The international communication efforts of the Global South should raise high the banner of development, use China’s development path as a reference, and contribute to building a universal and internationalist narrative of development—one that promotes justice for the Global South.